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ABSTRACT 
There is a worldwide movement towards alternatives to judicial decision-making for 
legal disputes.  In the domain of criminal sentencing, in Western countries more than 
95% of cases are guilty pleas, with many being decided by negotiations over charges 
and pleas, rather than a decision being made after a judge or jury has heard all 
relevant evidence in a trial. 
Because decisions are being made, and people incarcerated on the basis of 
negotiations, it is important that such negotiations be just and fair.  In this paper we 
discuss issues of fairness in plea-bargaining and how we can develop systems to 
support the process of plea and charge negotiation. 
We discuss how we are using Toulmin’s theory of argumentation and Lodder and 
Zeleznikow’s model of Online Dispute Resolution to develop just plea bargaining 
systems .  A specific investigation of the process of charge mentions is discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The mantra ‘two legs bad, four legs good’, taken from Orwell’s Animal Farm (Orwell 
1945) is similar to the statement ‘negotiation good, conflict bad’.  This mantra, often 
accepted by courts and governments is that negotiation is preferable to litigation in 
almost all circumstances. 
However, as Mnookin (2003) argues, knowing when to negotiate and when to refuse 
to negotiate is vital.  For example, On September 30 1938, Neville Chamberlain, the 
prime minister of the United Kingdom, returned from Munich saying ‘we have peace 
for our time’. Within twelve months, Kristallnacht had occurred1, the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact was signed2 and World War Two3 had commenced.  
Even now supporters (or apologists) of Chamberlain rationalise that he was correct, 
and that his actions in Munich won the United Kingdom vital time to prosecute the 
war4. So how can we measure when to negotiate and when to conduct conflicts, 
especially when knowledge is not transparent. Rather than solely focusing upon 
resolving conflicts, should we possibly concentrate on just managing the conflict?  
Condliffe (2008) argues that some conflicts cannot be resolved at all, and certainly 
not easily. 
Blum (2007) argues that protracted armed rivalries are often better managed rather 
than solved, because the act of seeking full settlement can invite endless frustration 
and danger, whilst missing opportunities for more limited but stabilising agreements.  
She examines in detail enduring rivalries between India and Pakistan, Greece and 
Turkey and Israel and Lebanon. She notes that in each of these conflicts, neither party 
is willing to resolve the core contested issues but both may be willing to carve out 
specific areas of the relationship to be regulated – what she calls islands of agreement. 
                                                 
1 On a single night, November 9-10 1938, more than 2,000 synagogues were destroyed and 
tens of thousands of jewish businesses were ransacked.  It marked the beginning of the 
systematic eradication of the Jewish people – the Holocaust - see Gilbert (2006). 
2 The pact, signed on August 23 1939, was a non-aggression pact between Germany and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that included a secret protocol for dividing the then 
independent countries of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania into Nazi 
and Soviet spheres of influence – see Taylor (1961) 
3 On September 1 1939, when Germany invaded Poland. 
4 As did the former Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Gordon Menzies in the twenty-
second Sir Richard Stawell Oration ‘Churchill and his contemporaries’ delivered at the 
University of Melbourne on 8 October 1955 – see 
www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/Speech_is_of_Time/202_ChurchillContemp.h
tml last accessed 23 July 2008 
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Similarly, rather than resolve a family dispute, should we just manage it so that 
minimal conflict or disruption occurs?  Eventually, the dispute might be more easily 
resolved or due to the progress of time, the dispute may no longer exist – such as 
when dependant children become adults.   
In both Australian and United States criminal law jurisdictions, a defendant can 
appeal a decision if they believe the judicial process was flawed. However, when 
negotiating about pleas – known as plea bargaining, a participant cannot challenge the 
decision.  The reason for this situation is that unlike in a trial, the defendant has 
pleaded guilty and thus admitted that he or she committed the crime. This situation 
becomes problematic in the admittedly few cases where a person accepts a plea 
bargain even though they did not commit the crime. The defendant may plead guilty 
because he or she was offered a heavily reduced sentence, or he or she felt the 
probability that they would be found guilty is reasonably high (Mackenzie 2007; 
Henham 1999). 
Thus, it is very difficult to undo an ‘unfair plea negotiation’. But it is also essential 
that it be possible to reverse unfair decisions. 
Hence, especially in criminal sentencing, it is vital that we develop ‘fair’ and ‘just’ 
negotiation support systems. Indeed, one of the barriers to the uptake of Online 
Dispute Resolution relates to user concerns about the fairness and consistency of 
outcomes achieved by any Online Dispute Resolution approach. Pierani (2005), in 
discussing Online Dispute Resolution in Italy, argues that as with Alternate Dispute 
Resolution models, Online Dispute Resolution systems need to be impartial, 
transparent, effective and fair.  
This is especially so in criminal law, because of the different proof requirements in 
civil and criminal law and the fact that criminal law cases involve the state 
prosecuting an individual, it is vital that issues of fairness be addressed. 
 
 
1.1. Plea Bargaining in general 
 
Negotiation between defence advocates and prosecutors about charges and pleas 
usually leads to a plea of guilty. Conviction rates by way of guilty plea in western 
jurisdictions, run in the order of 90-95%.  This is particular so in the US (Colella 
2004). In lower courts the rate of conviction by guilty pleas is usually higher than 
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95%. Where charges are more serious the rate of conviction by guilty plea is lower. 
Plea bargaining is the one of the most contentious processes in the criminal justice 
system, its most vehement opponents are usually those who are not involved in the 
day to day activity of either prosecuting or defending offenders. Despite judicial 
ambivalence to the practice in the most part, plea bargaining continues to function 
because discretion about the nature, number and severity of charges is granted to 
prosecuting authorities by statues. Plea bargaining can benefit the prosecution by 
ensuring a conviction and achieving greater certainty, and the defence by negotiating 
fewer or reduced charges (Mackenzie 2007). 
There are a range of criticism that are made concerning plea bargaining, perhaps most 
significant is the lack of transparency and the public’s perceived lack of fairness 
which ultimately translate in to complete lack of trust in the efficaciousness of the 
entire system. In this paper we first examine the phenomena of plea bargaining in 
general and then look at the particularities of its practice in Victoria. In the next 
section of the paper we expose similarities between plea bargaining and alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) and then move on to the role that sentence indication plays 
in the process. In the fourth part of the paper we discuss ideas of justice and fairness 
and the role systems have in constructing accountability. In the fifth section we 
discuss online dispute resolution (ODR) and a possible method of facilitating plea 
bargaining within the constraints of current practice. In the final section of the paper 
we discuss the problems with validating this type of system and the future research 
directions including the construction of a prototype system. 
The introduction to a recent plea bargaining symposium held at the Law School at 
Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, suggests that although plea 
bargaining would seems to be a natural area for collaboration between criminal law 
and dispute resolution there has been very little "cross-fertilization" between the two 
fields ((O'Hear and Kupfer Schneider, 2007)). Indeed research has progressed in the 
two areas utilising theories and methods developed in other areas, not solely limited 
to, for example, psychology. Plea bargaining research could gain for example from 
the large amount of work conducted in negotiation and mediation on fairness and 
procedural justice (Lind and Tyler, 1988), (Törnblom and Vermunt, 2007). 
Plea bargaining is the process where the prosecution and defence advocates negotiate 
or bargain or haggle over the nature, number and severity of the charges to be brought 
and the offenders plea of guilty.i It usually involves the reduction in the number, 
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nature and severity of the charges by the prosecutor in order to secure a guilty plea 
from an offender. Plea bargaining is only concerned with one thing and the defendant 
can only ever offer their guilt as the benefit to the prosecutors. This definition follows 
that offered by Alschuler (Alschuler, 1979) who also indicates that plea bargaining 
omits all forms of other concessionary bargaining, such as reductions in charges 
because of other cooperation. In the United States, plea bargaining is a ubiquitous 
practice and its occurrence is gaining strength in other jurisdictions (Ma, 2002). There 
has been a tremendous amount of criticism in academic circles of the practice of plea 
bargaining, many scholars argue that aside from the obvious lack of transparency and 
accountability of the procedure, prosecutors have become the primary adjudicators of 
guilt in the criminal justice system (see for example Bibas (2004) and Wright and 
Miller (2002)). By offering substantial reductions to defendants who cooperate with 
them, prosecutors strongly influence issues of guilt and innocence through the various 
methods of charge and plea negotiations. In most cases judges merely rubber stamp 
the negotiated arrangement.  
As alluded to above, the practice of plea bargaining is common in the United States, 
and increasingly so in Australia (Mackenzie 2007; Seifman and Freiberg 2001). Even 
though the practice is very wide spread there are few figures available on the extent of 
the practice. It is usually inferred from the amount of convictions by way of guilty plea 
recorded in official court statistics. Indeed, the number of felony convictions in US 
state courts for 2004 was estimated to be 1,078,920 of which approximately 95% were 
disposed of by guilty pleas.ii The figures for the US Federal Court, even though the 
numbers are considerably lower, track very similarly, albeit for the year 2007. Of the 
88,014 convicted felons, 96% were by way of guilty plea.iii The truly remarkable 
aspect of the statistical compilation is the complete lack of information on the number 
of guilty pleas affected by way of plea bargaining. There have been very few studies to 
determine the actual numbers of guilty pleas that have been brought about by 
negotiation or bargaining. A 1977 study on plea bargaining practices in the 
Birmingham Local Court in the United Kingdom, suggested that while up to 90% of 
cases in the US are disposed of by way of guilty plea the number that are the result of 
bargains remains unknown ((Baldwin and McConville, 1977)). The same study 
reported the researcher's surprise to find that 70% guilty pleas in their sample were 
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negotiated. Hollander-Blumoff ((Hollander-Blumoff, 1997)5) suggests that, "[b]y most 
accounts, plea bargaining disposes of approximately 90% of all criminal cases in the 
US." Hollander-Blumoff cites the guilty plea rates as evidence for her conclusion. The 
lack of empirical data is understandable given the difficulty in accessing offenders and 
prosecutors. Notwithstanding this difficulty it is clear that more empirical evidence is 
required.  
The high rate of conviction by way of guilty plea has led commentators to suggest that 
the criminal justice system would grind to a halt if all offenders exercised their rights 
to trial (Ward and Birgden 2007). However, guilty pleas would still be tendered 
without the explicit process of plea bargaining. There are still many incentives for 
defenders to plea guilty besides the reduction in the number and severity of charges. 
Most jurisdictions offer sentencing discounts for guilty pleas and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines allowing for downward departures based on guilty pleas. 
In the US, much has been made recently regarding the prosecutors ability to in effect 
coerce defendants to plead guilty. Langer (Langer, 2007) distinguishes between two 
different types of plea bargaining, the first is where the prosecutor unilaterally decides 
who is innocent and guilty and for which offence, by using coercive plea proposals. 
The second type of plea bargaining is where the prosecutor and defence jointly 
determine guilt via voluntary agreement.  
In jurisdictions where there are mandatory minimum sentences, the possibility of 
coercive bargaining is greater because in effect prosecutors have a direct impact on the 
sentence available to a judge. The success of the plea bargaining process “depends on 
[the] prosecutor’s ability to make credible threats of severe post-trial sentences 
(Stuntz, 2004)6." Credible threats concerning sentence severity are enhanced in 
jurisdictions that have determinate sentencing regimes. Thompson (Guerra Thompson, 
2005) indicates that by the end of the 1990s, fifteen States introduced sentencing 
guidelines, while seven were in the process of enacting relevant legislation. Most 
States in the United States have some form of mandatory minimum sentences for 
specific crimes (Reitz, 2001). Reitz suggests that even though there has been an 
impressive shift in determinate sentencing structure across the United States, most 
jurisdictions continue to maintain a high-discretion model of indeterminate sentencing 
for the majority of their punishment decisions.  The majority of punishment decisions 
                                                 
5 At pp 116-117 
6 At p2560 
 7 
to which Reitz refers may very well be the majority of less common crimes that litter 
statute books.  Most mandatory penalties are reserved for common crimes, especially 
relating to drugs, robbery and theft, and assaults (Frase, 2005). 
In Australia, the concept of plea negotiation is widely practised in all States but 
practitioners and academics alike prefer different terminologies. The practice is 
usually known as charge negotiation (Cowdery, 2005) or, more commonly, plea 
negotiation (Seifman and Freiberg, 2001) 
A major difference between the American and Australian plea bargaining practice is 
that in Australia, the prosecutor is only able to influence the minimum sentence that 
may be delivered by a judge by manipulating the number of charges, this is known as 
overcharging. It seems that the greatest amount of overcharging occurs in lower courts 
(Mack and Anleu, 1995). In the higher courts, where Offices of Public Prosecution and 
not the police handle prosecution, there is a tendency not to overcharge. Mack and 
Anleu (1996) suggest several reasons for this overcharging, but the most important 
one is that it gives the police a better bargaining position. The police propose high 
charges in order to end up with what they see as a “correct” or reasonable set of 
charges for a particular set of facts. 
The high percentage of cases disposed of by guilty pleas is not seen in Victoria.  In 
2003 and 2004, approximately 70% of cases were disposed of by guilty pleas7.  
There is a 25% difference between this rate and the rate of guilty pleas in the US. The 
difference is probably attributable to the determinate sentencing regimes that are 
prevalent in most United States jurisdictions and the fact that defendants often spend a 
long time on remand awaiting final disposition of their cases.  The resultant plea 
bargain is often for a sentence of time served (Bibas, 2004).  
But the practice of plea bargaining, while enhancing the efficiency of court 
administration, can result in many injustices. As in most aspects of negotiation, the 
parties in dispute do not generally have equal bargaining power. For example, 
defendants often have limited legal knowledge and sometimes a very limited ability to 
understand the charges of which they are accused. They do not have the time, money, 
or resources for protracted conflict. Thus, they may plead guilty to the commission of 
a crime, even when they know they are not guilty of committing the crime.  
                                                 
7 OFFICE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004 (Vict., Austl.), at 21 app. A, available at 
http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Office+Of+Public+Prosecutions/resources/file/eb62ed006698fd0/O
PP_Annual_Report_2003-04.pdf  Last accessed October 28 2008. 
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There has been considerable judicial and academic debate in Australia over the nature 
and justification for the guilty plea discount ((Mack and Anleu, (1997), Mack and 
Anleu (1998), Field (2002) and Bagaric and Brebner (2002)). Seifman and Freiberg 
(2001) claim that plea bargaining is inherently useful to the criminal justice system, 
not just because of administrative efficiency; as it enables the accused, if properly 
advised, to negotiate concessions in the form of reduced charges or which facts are to 
be put before the court.  It is critical however that the accused has as certain as 
possible an indication of the sentence which will be imposed (Mack and Anleu 1995), 
and this is where the current system is lacking. 
 
1.2. Plea Bargaining and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
Because plea bargaining requires some type of negotiation or bargaining, some 
scholars treat plea bargaining according to the classic observation in negotiation 
literature that negotiation occurs in the shadow of the law. The shadow of trial 
concept was introduced by Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979). By examining divorce 
law, they contended that the legal rights of each party could be understood as 
bargaining chips that can affect settlement outcomes. Plea bargaining in the United 
States, even though it has had the support of the Supreme Court for more than thirty 
years,8 has been heavily criticized because of the power of the prosecutor to 
selectively utilize the bargaining process.  Bibas (2004) gives a very detailed 
exposition of the factors that affect plea bargaining and how they impact the fair 
allocation of punishment. He claims that trials in the United States already allocate 
punishment unfairly and that plea bargaining adds another layer of distortion. The 
idea put forward by Bibas is that the shadow cast by law is very much diminished 
and because of the fact that very few trials are conducted, plea bargaining occurs 
under the influence of other factors. Both Bibas and (Stuntz, 2004) have at the heart 
of their respective discussions the claim that the Mnookin-Kornhauser model is not 
really applicable to the plea-bargaining process because of the great number of other 
                                                 
8.Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).  Here, the Court stated: 
 
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn 
extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to 
admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in frame of mind that affords hope for success in 
rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary. 
 
Id. at 753. 
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influences on the actors and players in plea bargaining than exist in divorce 
negotiations. 
There are possible negative consequences of negotiating about pleas. Bibas (2004) 
argues that many plea bargains diverge from the shadow of trials. He claims that 
rather than basing sentences on the need for deterrence, retribution, incapacitation or 
rehabilitation, plea bargaining effectively bases sentences in part on wealth, sex, age, 
education, intelligence and confidence.  
Adelstein and Miceli (2001) develop a general model of plea bargaining, embed it in 
a larger framework that addresses the costs of adjudication, the value of punishing 
the guilty and the costs of false convictions, and then link the desirability of plea 
bargaining and compulsory prosecution to the weights given these costs and benefits 
in the objective function.  
Gazal-Ayal (2006) investigates the economics of plea bargaining.  He proposes 
having a partial ban on plea bargains, which prohibits prosecutors from offering 
substantial plea concessions. He argues that such a ban can act to discourage 
prosecutors from bringing weak cases and thus reduce the risk of wrongful 
convictions. Tor, Gazal-Ayal and Garcia (2006) conducted experiments in which 
they determined that defendants' willingness to accept a plea bargain is substantially 
reduced when defendants feel that the offer is unfair, either because they are not 
guilty or because other defendants received better offers.   
Wright and Miller (2003) believe that pervasive harm stems from charge bargains 
due to their special lack of transparency. They argue that charge bargains, even more 
than sentencing concessions, make it difficult after the fact, to sort out good bargains 
from bad, in an accurate or systematic way. 
Although it may be possible to suggest that plea bargaining is a form of dispute 
resolution is a unique form. Any attempt to apply generic lessons of negotiation 
theory in criminal law should be undertaken with great care.  
As indicated by O'Hear and Kupfer Schneider (2007) dispute resolution involves the 
allocation of limited material resources between two parties of roughly equal and 
moral status. The transaction in plea bargaining is between parties of a different sort 
(the citizen and state). There is a major asymmetry between the status, power and 
objective of the two sides that marks out plea bargaining in significant ways from 
other forms of negotiation commonly studied by dispute resolution scholars. 
(Freiberg, 2007) discusses ADR in the criminal justice system and suggests that 
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ADR should be understood as appropriate dispute resolution rather alternative 
dispute resolution. He further indicates that rather concentrating upon dispute 
resolution, the focus of the criminal justice system should be on problem solving. 
Plea bargaining should be viewed through the lens of problem solving in the same 
space as sentence indication. All efforts should be made to identify guilty pleas early 
in the process and then move to the next stage in the criminal justice system, namely 
the therapeutic phase.  
Hollander-Blumoff (1997) concentrates on Fisher and Ury's notion of BATNA 
(Fisher and Ury 1981). In the process of negotiating about pleas it is vitally important 
that the defence has an accurate indication of the sentence that might be expected: a) 
as a result of trial and b) as the result to a plea of guilty. A recent discussion of 
sentence indication in Victoria highlights the importance of scheme where judges 
indicate a likely outcome in terms not necessarily of sentence but whether or not a 
conviction or jail time for example maybe warranted for a particular charge or set of 
charges9. It is contingent on certain disclosures by both the prosecution and the 
defence. 
 
2. SENTENCING INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
 
Achieving consistency and fairness is critical in the sentencing process (Mackenzie, 
2002). Hall et al (2005) argue that one of the central and perennial questions of 
sentencing law and scholarship is how lawmakers should strike an appropriate 
balance between consistency and individualization in punishment. They believe that 
their technology-based solutions can help to maximize consistency of process in 
bounded discretion-sentencing regimes. They use decision trees10 and Toulmin 
argument trees11 to model reasoning about sentences in the Victorian County Court. 
Such solutions enable greater flexibility to achieve consistency in complex cases 
where large numbers of interdependent factors need to be taken into consideration by 
                                                 
9 See 
http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Sentencing+Council/resources/file/ebb5cd402c7f553/
Sentence_Indication_Final_Report.pdf last accessed 28 October 2008 
10 A decision tree is an explicit representation of all scenarios that can result from a given decision.  
The root of the tree represents the initial situation, whilst each path from the root corresponds to one 
possible scenario. 
11 See section 4. 
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the sentencing judge. This is in contrast to most Sentencing Information Systems, 
which use statistical techniques to advise upon a range of issues (Schild and 
Zeleznikow 2008). 
Structured sentencing laws create a more pressing need for information systems that 
allow prosecutors to monitor the selection of charges and resolution of plea 
negotiations, since those decisions now influence more directly the sentences that the 
judge ultimately imposes. Wright and Miller (2003) and Wright (2005) point out the 
powerful influence of prosecutor office policy and data monitoring in creating 
reasonably consistent outcomes in plea negotiations. Hall et al (2005) stress that they 
are not concerned with considering the vexed issue of consistency of outcomes, but 
rather, they are concerned with the consistency of approaches to decision-making 
(procedural consistency) and the presentation of arguments to support decision-
making.   
Traditional Negotiation Support Systems have focused upon providing users with 
decision support on how they might best obtain their goals.  Zeleznikow and Bellucci 
(2006) and Zeleznikow and Vincent (2007) have considered the problem of 
incorporating justice into interest-based negotiation support systems. Zeleznikow et 
al (2007) considered the development of computer tools for Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law in plea-bargaining and family mediation, as well as examining 
how to measure and evaluate consistency and justice in negotiation. 
Building systems to support the various parties involved in the sentencing process is 
fraught with difficulties. Tata (2000) has detailed the effort in the construction of the 
Scottish Sentencing Information System and discusses some of the reasons why 
judicial decision support systems are not well received by the judiciary. One of the 
primary reasons for judicial ambivalence is the fact that most systems do not 
accurately reflect either the manner in which judges reach their decision or are so 
complicated that they are virtually useless. Until now, we have not discussed the link 
between how a sentencing decision is reached and how the reasons for the sentence 
are articulated. In Australia written decisions are not always made available for 
sentencing decisions at first instance. The opaqueness of the process is further 
exacerbated by the lack of articulation of reasons. 
We now describe a decision support system we are developing to assist criminal 
defence lawyers at Victoria Legal Aid to provide advice about plea bargaining and 
sentencing. The sentencing decision support system is being extended into a plea 
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bargaining support system, using the three step online dispute resolution environment 
of Lodder and Zeleznikow (2005). 
 
3. THE TOULMIN ARGUMENT MODEL FOR BUILDING 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
 
Vincent and Zeleznikow (2005) discusses research pertaining to the construction of a 
plea bargaining decision support system for Victoria Legal Aid (VLA). VLA finds 
decision support systems that advise upon appropriate decisions for the sentencing of 
criminals, as well as systems that will help in the plea negotiation process, very useful 
for training and providing support for novice lawyers. 
VLA is the principal provider of legal aid in Victoria, in fact VLA is the largest 
criminal law practice in the State and handles upwards of eighty percent of criminal 
law defence cases in Victoria. It employs solicitors to act on behalf of people and 
provides a range of specialist legal services. It is funded by a combination of 
Commonwealth government, Legal Practice Board’s Public Purpose Fund and state 
government monies also legal cost received by VLA. It is in their interests to be able 
to provide sound advice regarding possible sentences as the result of guilty pleas. The 
sentencing decision support prototype and its ability to provide the reasoning behind a 
sentence as well as a sentence range means that VLA lawyers can better negotiate 
with Office of Public Prosecution lawyers and police prosecutors. The reasoning 
behind a particular sentence can act as an argument in favour of a particular charge 
over another. 
The approach to modelling the discretionary and intuitive domain of sentencing is 
based on the model of argument proposed by Toulmin (1958). The Toulmin model is 
concerned with showing that logic can be seen as a kind of jurisprudence rather than 
science. The jurisprudential nature of the Toulmin argument structure means that it is 
process focused and more useful in structuring an argument after it has been 
articulated. It is able to capture arguments regardless of content. The procedural 
nature and simplicity of the Toulmin model means that argument chains can be 
constructed by linking together single argument units.  
The claim of one argument can be used as the data item for the next. According to 
Toulmin, an argument is made up of a combination of five components: a claim, some 
data (grounds), a warrant, some backing, and a qualifier. Claims are ideas that the 
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arguer would like the audience to believe. The data lends support to the claim and 
makes it more likely that the audience will believe it. The warrant, on the other hand, 
is the logic of the argument: the rules of inference that lead the claimant to conclude 
the claim, given one ground or a set of grounds12. Backings usually give reasons why 
the audience should believe the warrant. Modal qualifiers modify the claim by 
indicating a degree of reliance on, or scope of generalisation of, the claim, given the 
grounds, warrants, and backing available. Rebuttals are the possible exceptions to the 
conditions under which a claim holds. 
The Toulmin argument structure offers those interested in knowledge engineering a 
method of structuring domain knowledge. It also enables the reasoning behind certain 
claims to be made explicit. In any system that will be of use to decision makers, 
reasons for decisions are important, especially for transparency. The Toulmin Model 
has been used to model other legal domains (Zeleznikow 2003) most notably family 
law in the Split-Up system which advised disputing partners regarding property 
distribution at divorce (Stranieri et al 1999), refugee law (Yearwood and Stranieri 
1999) and copyright law (Stranieri and Zeleznikow 2001).  The use of Toulmin 
Argumentation in Online Dispute Resolution is discussed in Zeleznikow (2006). 
The modelling phase was undertaken by knowledge engineers in conjunction with 
domain experts to establish the practical nature of the sentencing environment in 
Victoria. After reading the relevant parliamentary acts governing the Victorian 
sentencing system, both knowledge engineers and domain experts developed the 
decision and argument trees. The modelling procedures and steps are more fully 
discussed in Hall et al (2005).  
With the support of a grant from the Victorian Partnership for Advanced Computing, 
TAMS software is being used to convert free-text sentencing decisions into a fixed 
format.  Following from the successful use of neural networks in the family law 
domain (Stranieri et al 1999) we are using neural networks and association rules to 
glean how sentencing decisions are made13. 
 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that inferences can be provided by humans rather than machines.  This occurred in the 
Embrace System (Yearwood and Straniery 1999) which dealt with the discretionary issue of appeals to the 
Australian Refugee Review Tribunal. 
13 See Zeleznikow and Hunter (1994) and Stranieri and Zeleznikow (2005) for an excellent discussion of the use of 
artificial intelligence in law 
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4. AN ONLINE PLEA NEGOTIATION ENVIRONMENT FOR THE 
VICTORIAN CONTEST MENTION SYSTEM 
 
Criticisms of plea negotiation have centred around several keys issues, 
namely: transparency, inducements and coercion, and incorrect outcomes 
(Bibas 2004). Mack and Anleu (1996) have identified faults in the process. 
The significant points include: 
1. The transparency of the process: in general, plea bargaining occurs 
outside the court system. 
2. Guilty pleas may be induced by the unwarranted benefits of those 
burdens caused by the decision to go to trial. The quantum of sentence 
discount that is associated with the plea of guilty is an added pressure 
to engage in plea bargaining. 
3. Incorrect outcomes in terms of both the determination of guilt and the 
subsequent sentence imposed. 
These three main areas of concern are all present in the Victorian Contest 
Mention system. If the accused decides to plead guilty to the charges filed, the 
charges are dealt with at the time of the Contest Mention hearing. The facts of 
the case are presented orally to the magistrate by the prosecutor by way of a 
written summary of the offence, which has been agreed to by the defence 
lawyer. There is no transparency in this process, as the magistrates are 
presented with only an altered copy of the summary and it is this summary 
alone that is preserved on the record 
The Victorian Magistrates’ Court deals with over 95% of all criminal offences 
that are resolved in Victorian courts.14 Of the 130,890 matters finalised in 
2003-04, 9082 were finalised via the Contest Mention.15  
In 1993, as a result of the severe impact of late guilty pleas,16 the Contest 
Mention system was introduced in the Broadmeadows Magistrates’ Court. It 
was initially a pilot program with the specific aims:17 
                                                 
14 The figure of 95% is derived from the Victorian Magistrates’ Courts Sentencing Statistics: 1996/1997-
2001/2002, p. 1. A brief examination of both the Victorian Magistrates’ Courts Sentencing Statistics: 1996/1997-
2001/2002 and the Victorian Higher Courts Sentencing Statistics: 1997/1998-2001/2002 leads to a figure of 
around 97% of all defendants who had charges decided without resort to either bench or jury trial. 
15 Magistrates’ Court of Victoria 2003-04 Annual Report, 15. 
16 Identified in part in the Pegasus Task Force Report, Reducing Delays in Criminal Cases (1992). 
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1. To reduce the number of cases originally listed as pleas of not guilty 
that turned into guilty pleas at the court door. 
2. To identify the plea (guilty or not guilty) at an early stage. 
3. To reduce the number of adjournments. 
4. To narrow the issues between the parties to areas of genuine dispute 
thereby reducing wasted preparation time by both the prosecution and 
the defense. 
5. To reduce the instances of witnesses’ time being unnecessarily wasted. 
6. To generally assist in ‘case flow management’ techniques. 
The Contest Mention system is a set of procedural guidelines for assisting the 
prosecution and defence lawyers in identifying guilty pleas. Attempting to 
identify guilty pleas involves negotiation and, as indicated by Cowdery 
(2005),18 “principled negotiation” 19. This involves the separation of the 
people from the problem this will be discussed a little later. One of the main 
features of the Contest Mention system is the process of sentence indication.20 
The magistrate can give an indication as to a possible sentence if the accused 
continued with a plea of guilty at the Contest Mention. It is only conducted in 
appropriate circumstances. The Contest Mention guidelines state that the 
procedure should only be undertaken when the magistrate is aware of all the 
relevant factors. 
For the accused, the burdens of going to trial are caused by the probability of 
conviction by a jury and the consequent threat of a usually higher sentence 
based on the higher number and severity of the charges filed by the 
prosecution and the lack of a sentence discount for an early guilty plea. In the 
case of an impasse in the Contest Mention, the magistrate can offer an opinion 
as to the relative strengths and weaknesses of both the prosecution and 
defence cases. This opinion is not derived from formal evidence or even a 
reading of the summary, but rather from information provided by the 
prosecution and defence counsel. 
                                                                                                                                           
17 A more detailed discussion of the implementation of the Contest Mention system is available in Serge Straijt, 
The ‘Contest Mention System’ in the Magistrates’ Court. Some of its effect and impact on the administration of 
criminal justice (Unpublished Report, 1995). 
18 At  2, 2. 
19 See especially Fisher and Ury (1981) at 17-39. 
20 Magistrates’ Court – Guidelines for Contest Mention, 3. 
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We are constructing a plea negotiation support environment for Contest 
Mentions in the Victorian Magistrates’ Court and more broadly plea 
negotiations in other jurisdictions. The current system is intended to be used 
by VLA lawyers to support plea negotiations and possibly to train 
inexperienced advocates. The system consists of two major parts.  
The first part is a sentencing decision support system which provides 
information as to possible range of sentences and also the probability of 
attaining the recommended sentence. The second part is an environment for 
plea negotiation. The first and integral part of the overall system advises on 
possible sentence so as to properly apprise defendants of all the possible 
negotiation outcomes. The effects of suggested charge changes can be 
assessed using the sentencing information system part of the overall system. 
We are constructing the system using the Lodder-Zeleznikow framework. The 
key points of this framework are: 
1. Accurate provision of advice about a BATNA. 
2. Developing a process that enables direct communication and 
negotiation between the parties which supports interest based 
communication. 
3. Developing a process that provides negotiation support through the 
use of compensation and trade-off strategies. 
The BATNA: The sentencing decision support system described above, 
provides a BATNA.  The sentencing decision support system provides advice 
concerning possible sentences, as well as giving information about how these 
sentences might be combined, either cumulatively or consecutively in the case 
of multiple charges. It must be remembered though, that the sentence is not 
being negotiated; it is a plea of guilty to a particular charge or set of charges 
that needs to be decided. 
BATNA advice in plea negotiation, at present, is not provided by specific 
electronic tools. Zeleznikow and Stranieri have developed a system to provide 
BATNA advice in the Family Law domain (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006). 
Once an offer is made it must be measured against the BATNA. The step of 
reality testing is very important in the process of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR).  
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De Vries et al (2005) indicates that in the final stage of the negotiation 
process, reality testing provides an excellent method of ensuring that parties 
are fully aware of the agreement they are about to reach. The plea negotiation 
process is a form of shuttle bargaining, an offer followed by a counter offer. 
The defence lawyer evaluates the quality/benefit of the offer and either accepts 
of rejects the offer and makes a new offer. This is the case in the Contest 
Mention system as it operates in Victorian Magistrates’ Courts. Unless the 
defence lawyer is experienced, the types of negotiations that occur before the 
beginning of the Contest Mention can be very problematic and difficult. A less 
experienced lawyer might accept a plea that might not be the best achievable 
outcome in the situation even though it may have been perfectly adequate for 
another defendant in a different case. 
Communication: There are various methods of electronic communication 
available for parties to conduct negotiations. E-mails, SMS messaging, 
telephone, “snail” mail can all be used for effective communication. For 
example, Square Trade21 is one of the largest suppliers of online dispute 
resolution and utilises e-mail exchange via a mediator to resolve issues.  
The method of negotiation discussed in the Lodder-Zeleznikow model needs 
to be adjusted to reflect the differences in the process of resolving plea 
negotiations. The fact that the defence need not make any disclosures but the 
prosecution must divulge all the facts, as they are relevant to the charges, must 
be taken into account in our revised model. The argument tool used in the 
Lodder-Zeleznikow model is utilised to make explicit how the statements of 
the parties support their arguments. The tool makes the parties enter 
statements in a sequence that reflects the evidence cited for supporting each 
party’s goals. 
Negotiation: The method that is utilized in the Lodder-Zeleznikow model to 
support compromises and trade-offs revolves around the creation of lists of 
issues. In the case of the Contest Mention, the concerns of the prosecutor and 
the defence may well be overlapping in some respects, but can also be quite 
different in others. There are two matters that might be of little concern to the 
                                                 
21 More information about the range of services offered by Square Trade can be found at 
http://www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/index.jsp (at 20 November 2006). 
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defendant but of a much greater concern to the prosecutor; the impact on the 
victim and restitution. 
Most of the other issues in dispute will revolve around the facts of the crime. 
These will usually be aggravating factors that make the sentence more severe. 
The accused may well plead guilty to a crime but not admit to certain facts. 
The perceived strength of the prosecutor’s evidence will be the major inhibitor 
to a plea bargain being struck. The Lodder-Zeleznikow framework includes a 
phase where compromise and trade-offs are utilized to assist in the resolution 
of disputes. The trade off part of the Lodder-Zeleznikow model is based on the 
Family_Winner system (Bellucci and Zeleznikow 2006). The system asks 
individuals for their positions and importantly their reasons for taking their 
positions. The system uses a point allocation procedure to distribute items or 
issues to the participant who values the item or issue more. The system 
provides possible suitable allocation of items or issues but is dependant on 
human interlocutors to accept and finalize an agreement. 
The Contest Mention system does not at first glance lend itself to the process 
of creating lists of issues. One of the greatest problems to overcome in this 
process is the case of multiple charges. Combining charges is one of the 
methods that the prosecutor may use to ensure that a plea of guilty is obtained 
for a particular desired charge. The various charges that might be levelled for 
a particular set of facts will vary if the defendant does not admit to the veracity 
of some of the facts. 
One of the key elements in the authors’ on going research is to establish what 
is negotiable in the plea negotiation and how the information can be 
represented and negotiated using the Lodder-Zeleznikow model. 
 
5. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
One of the most difficult tasks still remaining is the validating the system. The 
usual method of validating expert systems requires experts trialling the system 
with a real case or cases and then measuring the accuracy of the advice 
provide by the system. Our Negotiation Support System will require two 
levels of validation, the first relating to the sentencing indication and the 
second to the accuracy of the replication of the process of the negotiation.  
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As noted in section one, plea-bargaining can be seen as a form of negotiation 
that has benefits of administrative efficiency for the prosecution and provides 
certainty for the defence. Generally, the interests of the parties focus upon 
reduced sentences and reducing costs. In other negotiation domains, in 
particular housing disputes and family relationships, more complex trade-offs 
can be employed to meet the parties’ interests. 
In conjunction with industry partners Relationships Australia and Victoria 
Body Corporate we have received substantial funding from the Australian 
Research Council to develop negotiation support systems to enable the 
continuation of constructive relationships following disputes.  
In this project we wish to combine integrative bargaining, bargaining in the 
shadow of the law and formulation to develop decision support systems that 
support mediation and negotiation, specifically in body corporate and family 
disputes.  We will: 
a) develop negotiation support systems that support formulation: both in 
Family Law and Body Corporate disputes. The systems will respect 
ethical and legal principles and rely upon processes that are not only 
fair but are perceived by the parties to be fair. 
b) construct negotiation support systems that provide planning advice to 
help avoid disputes rather than resolve conflicts. 
c) develop an integrated Online Dispute Resolution environment that 
provides relevant legal knowledge, allows for communication and 
provides decision support tools. 
d) use knowledge discovery from databases techniques to try and learn 
how mediators provide advice. 
e) thoroughly evaluate and re-engineer our negotiation support systems.  
In a project with title ‘Developing negotiation support systems in law which 
encourage more consistent and principled outcomes’ we argue that unless 
negotiation support systems are seen to advocate outcomes which arise from 
consistent and principled advice, disputants will be reluctant to use them.  We 
are conducting research that will develop measures for assessing the outcomes 
of online negotiation in the legal domains of sentencing, plea bargaining and 
family mediation. Such measures will form the basis of a new model for 
evaluating justice and consistency within online dispute resolution systems. 
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The model will inform the construction of fairer and more consistent systems 
of IT-based negotiation support in the future. 
To meet this goal we will: 
1. Develop models of consistency and justice based on two very distinct 
legal domains: sentencing and family law. Further, the knowledge 
about these domains will be shared from three distinct Common Law 
jurisdictions: Australia, Israel and USA. 
2. Develop information retrieval techniques to extract knowledge from 
textual legal and negotiation data. 
3. Use KDD techniques (such as association rules, Bayesian belief 
networks and neural networks) to compare litigated and negotiated 
family law cases. 
4. Develop models of disputation and negotiation in both family law and 
sentencing.  These models will then be tested to examine how closely 
they align with the notion of Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law (as 
compared to ‘pure’ interest-based negotiation). 
5. Use Lodder and Zeleznikow’s three step model for an Online Dispute 
Resolution Environment and Toulmin’s theory of argumentation to 
construct a generic online dispute resolution environment.  The 
development of such an environment on which to place various 
negotiation support systems will increase users’ access to justice. 
6. Develop and evaluate specific sentencing and negotiation support 
systems using our newly developed Online Dispute Resolution 
Environment. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The Toulmin model, although probably intended as a method of exploring 
arguments in a more theoretical setting, is finding itself used more and more in 
representing knowledge in different types of decision support whether 
computerized or not. The great benefit of this type of system comes about as it 
begins to make the intuitive part of sentencing more transparent and open to 
scrutiny. This system provides a method for lawyers, both experienced and 
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inexperienced, to make better arguments for sentences for client before the 
bench. 
In this paper we have considered how a plea bargaining decision support 
system can help support the advocacy provided by Victoria Legal Aid. Such 
systems are particularly useful for training novices. The first step in the plea 
bargaining process is determining relevant sentences. With this goal in mind, 
we have developed an appropriate decision support system. We are currently 
using the sentencing decision support system together with the Lodder-
Zeleznikow three step online dispute resolution environment to build our plea 
bargaining decision support system.  
Rhode (2004) suggests that “Court-appointed lawyers’ preparation is often 
minimal; sometimes taking less time than the average American spends 
showering before work.” As part of the overall push to improve access to 
justice, decision support system can help to achieve that goal. They can 
provide important advice for the legally disadvantaged.  This advice is useful 
both at trial and in conducting charge and plea negotiations. 
The Lodder-Zeleznikow framework is a useful method for the construction of 
a negotiation support environment for the charge and plea negotiation process. 
It has great potential for making the plea negotiation process more transparent 
and efficient, both in Australia and overseas. 
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i In this paper we use the term bargaining and negotiation interchangeably, it worth 
noting that there is some disquiet in some circles about the use of the term bargaining. 
ii Table 5.46.2004. It is most notable that for the more serious crimes the percentage of conviction via 
guilty plea drops considerably. Of the number of felony convicted of murder 69% were by way of 
guilty plea. 
 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Source Book of Criminal Justice Statistics 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/, at 20 November 2006), especially tables 5.17 and 5.46. Bibas 
(2004) also indicates that it is impossible to know the percentage of guilty pleas that resulted from plea 
bargaining. 
iii Table 5.24.2007. The percentage of convictions secured by way of guilty pleas for 
murder in District courts is 78% (calculated on very low numbers 117 of the 146 
total). 
